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Paul Veyne, Foucault: His Thought, His Character. Translated by Janet Lloyd (Cam-
bridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), ISBN: 978-0745646428 
 
The present book amplifies an article of Veyne’s written soon after his dear friend’s death.1 
Both works not only position Foucault in theory, philosophy, and historiography, but they 
also treat us to insights about the man with anecdotes from his life.  But with this amplification 
the representation of Foucault’s thought becomes fuzzy even as new aspects of the person 
peek from time’s shadows.  Oddly, closer to events, the article only occasionally alludes to the 
battles of the 1970s when Foucault was ‚bogyman of philosophers and historians alike‛2 
whereas the book repeatedly looks over its shoulder.  Foucault frequently pummels the wind-
mills of Truth, the Transcendent, and even Christianity.3  Readers most interested in the first 
half of Foucault’s subtitle will profit most, I believe, by trying to figure out several of its inte-
resting, if inadvertently raised, problems.  In a moment I’ll develop two: why so many who 
have taken Foucault seriously, including Veyne and Habermas, are wrong to declare him a de-
cisionist; and why, contrary to Veyne, Foucault really was and remains ‚a corrupter of the 
young.‛ (Chapter 9)  That quality of Foucault’s thought which both the book and the article 
make central is the status of truth.  So I will first focus on Veyne’s characterization of Foucaul-
dian truth, then transition to facets of the true Foucault. 
Now, one’s methods and methodological assumptions constitute one’s orientation to 
truth.  How should we say Foucault was oriented to truth?  Present-day Veyne presents us 
with an almost synchronic and disorientingly kaleidoscopic Foucault: nominalist, sceptic, em-
pirical anthropologist, archeologist, genealogist, hermeneutic positivist (Chapter 1), decisio-
nist, positivist, anti-realist,4 Nietzschian perspectivist, an ‚ontologist *...] of discursive practices 
of knowledge, set-ups of power and forms of subjectivization,‛ (Chapter 3; 51) empiricist, 
                                                 
1 Paul Veyne, ‚The Final Foucault and His Ethics,‛ Critical Inquiry 20 (Autumn 1993), translated by Cathe-
rine Porter and Arnold I. Davidson.  The translators note that the article had originally appeared in 1986 
‚without Veyne’s remarks on Foucault and AIDS *...which they+ have restored‛ (1) at the author’s request. 
2 Stephen Bann, ‚Towards a Critical Historiography: Recent Work in Philosophy of History,‛ Philosophy 56 
(1981), 382. 
3 ‚I am in a position to testify that Foucault was not the devil that some (by no means negligible) figures 
believed him to be.‛ (112)  In this context, Veyne refers to a ‚funeral oration, delivered at the Collège in 1984, 
[which] declared that the philosophy of the deceased consisted in denying what one had always believed, 
that is to say the truth, normality and morality.‛ (178n4) 
4 Though Veyne mostly denies late Foucault’s quasi-Kantian posture, he admits it at 169n7. 
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‚specialized intellectual,‛ (Chapter 6; 76 (yes, there are a few translation and editing issues)) 
Nietzschean hermeneuticist (Chapter 7), irrationalist, advocate of instrumental reason in 
political contexts, voluntarist (Chapter 9, 115, 120, 122, respectively), ‚staunchly amoralistic‛ 
(Chapter 10, 131) yet one for whom ‚morality mattered.‛ (Chapter 11, 144)  (A number of 
these characterizations are not limited to the chapters cited.) 
In contrast, on several occasions Veyne’s explanations of basic ideas tolerably bear their 
burdens.  The first five paragraphs of Chapter 8, for example, show that genealogies render 
first- and second-order truths relative as such to discursive practices; such truths are not cor-
respondence to things-as-they-are.  Therefore, since a critical genealogy is a ‚truthful balance-
sheet of ‘discourses’ [...its] truth still remains the condition for the possibility of that critique.‛ 
(93) 
It may be that Veyne has no consistent take on ‚Foucauldism‛ (51) because he has not 
learned the lesson he claims to have learned from Bernard Williams’s criticism of ‚the little 
book of [his] youth, Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths?‛ (164n1) Veyne quotes the unlearned 
lesson: ‚‘an extravagant relativism about truth, or worse.’‛ (165n1)  Unlearned, for Veyne 
often praises the ‚warrior‛ in Foucault, a member of the tribe whose ‚minds avoid the desire 
for truth,‛ (121)5 for whom ‚there are no general truths,‛ (45) for whom ‚the general ideas that 
humanity has produced over the centuries are all false, since they are irreconcilable.‛ (87)  
(Note the multiple problems in that last claim.)  ‚Fishbowl‛ is Veyne’s term of art for the sets 
of discursive practices that make the truths of an era possible.6  On the one hand, consistent 
with the previous paragraph, Foucauldian genealogy ‚raises us above ourselves, lifting us out 
of our time [...] out of our fishbowl‛; (74; also e.g. 117, 127, 136) but, on the other hand, ‚Fou-
cault is almost obsessively aware [...that] the impossibility of rising above and looking down 
on thought means that even the most revolutionary of thinkers can never escape from our 
little world of ‘discourse.’‛ (84)  This is not our aporia but Veyne’s persisting extravagance. 
Related to this deep confusion about the status of truth in Foucault’s thought is the first 
of the two interesting problems mentioned a moment ago.  Was Foucault a decisionist, some-
one without reasons for his values convictions? Certainly, ‚Foucauldism is a critique of actua-
lity that is careful not to dictate prescriptions for action.‛ (116)  Equally true is that while Fou-
cault became a militant activist across a range of issues, he ‚did not put forward arguments in 
favour of his causes.  Rather, he tried to arouse indignation.‛ (123)7  Rorty nailed it, in my 
view, in calling Foucault a ‚Knight of Autonomy.‛  Foucault looks like a decisionist on the 
outside, but his ‚subjectivity was not purely a matter of whims.  It was based on personal ex-
perience and knowledge.‛ (122) 
Yet Veyne enables a deeper glimpse into the nature of Foucault’s commitment to his 
values.  His portrait in the final paragraphs of the penultimate chapter, ‚Foucault and Poli-
tics,‛ brings to mind none other than Anna Karenina’s Levin.  Recall that the troubled Levin, 
                                                 
5 Cf. Veyne 1993: ‚a warrior is a man who can get along without truth.‛ (2) 
6 Cf. Veyne 1993: ‚truths *... are] the set of rules that make it possible to utter and to recognize those pro-
positions held as true.‛ (3) 
7 Cf. Veyne 1993: There is ‚a little-noticed characteristic of Foucault’s work, a philosophically grounded 
elegance that was apparent in his private conversation, from which anger was not excluded, but indignation 
was.‛ (6) 
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wealthy master of a large estate, finally finds intellectual and spiritual peace in fideism.  Tol-
stoy described that faith unforgettably in Levin’s gloriously happy, days-long, silent, sweaty 
scything side-by-side his illiterate peasants.  Similarly, Foucault’s ‚self-observation had shown 
him that, through his work, he had reached a point where, even if unequal in dignity, intel-
lectual activities of the most prosaic and humble nature were indistinguishable from literary 
or artistic creations.  For Foucault, this was a kind of religion [...which] allows one to accede 
both to an impersonality in which the self of the researcher or writer disappears and to the 
birth of a self without qualities.‛ (133f)  It does not follow that Foucault was a decisionist be-
cause he ‚believed that chasm *between scholarship and politics, between word and deed+ to 
be irremediable.‛ (119)  Reasons of the heart (116) are not for other’s ears, but they are one’s 
truths. 
The second interesting problem: was Foucault a corrupter of youth?  Veyne casts his 
rhetorical question in dimly Socratic light, alluding to charges from advocates of Truth and the 
Transcendent.  Take it straight: do Knights of Autonomy practicing genealogy corrupt?  Bad 
prescriptions, explicitly in word or implicitly in deed, would be candidates, but only trying to 
arouse indignation rules out the former. 
So is Foucault’s life example enough to trip unwary youth into perdition?  According to 
Veyne, Foucault outed himself to close friends in 1954.  At that time ‚homosexuality was invi-
sible and totally forbidden.  [...Foucault] was then a young man, living with aggressive bitter-
ness with his difference and his scorn of both others and himself.‛ (140)  So at that time the 
closet kept corruption away.  But 20 years later ‚*t+here was nothing at all hysterical about 
him.  He had become ‘a decent pédé (pederast) with no problems,’ as he himself put it.‛ (141) 
Then, teaching at Berkeley he indulged, ‚in controlled episodes,‛ ‚his taste for drugs, opium 
and LSD, [...and would] jaunt to some gay sauna in San Francisco’s homosexual ghetto, where 
his behavior was less sadistic than some have assumed.‛ (142)  Of course, neither Veyne nor 
we could think that the example of his last decade would corrupt anyone by tarnishing Truth 
and the Transcendent.  For, first, we smile in envy when he tells us with gay pride that 
‚Foucault had bestowed upon *him+ the title of ‘honorary homosexual.’‛ (138)  And, second, 
since anyone for whom T² lights the way is impregnably protected from the Foucaults of this 
world, no corruption ensues there either. 
But persuasive prescriptions and implicit seductions are not the only routes to corrup-
tion.  In the book already referred to, Bernard Williams argues that genealogy has two modes: 
critical and vindicatory.8  If we understand corruption to be some dissolution of adhered and 
crucial values, then effective critical genealogy must accomplish that.  Yet for late Foucault, as 
we know, that goes hand-in-hand with the Enlightenment’s ongoing labour of liberty.  Only 
partially implicit in his critique of governmentality is a vindicatory genealogy of (some ver-
sion of) liberalism.  Critique harrows the soil for freedom; such corruption is necessary to ena-
ble youth to flourish. 
For all his admiration and praise, Veyne avoids hagiography.  Thus, Foucault’s under-
standing ‚of *Max+ Weber was incorrect‛; (35)  The Archaeology of Knowledge was ‚written too 
                                                 
8 Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002). 
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early and too hastily.‛ (84) Perhaps.  Then we are disarmingly informed that with respect to 
‚current affairs *Foucault+ would have liked to possess real intellectual clout (which he never 
really did).‛ (132)  Again, Foucault caught grief from many quarters when he ‚declared him-
self to be ‘impressed by this [Iranian revolution’s] attempt to open up a religious dimension in 
politics.’‛ (127)  The episode elicits desultory discussion, then breaks off: ‚I have not the heart 
to go on about it.‛ (128)  It seems to me, however, that Veyne has set before us the pieces of a 
third, fascinating Foucault puzzle.  Precisely a ‚‘political spirituality,’‛ (127, Veyne cites 
Foucault) with no taint of any Stoic God or gods, much less gooey California new-ageism, 
might tie together Foucault’s value fideism, militant indignations, and care of the self. 
Foucault’s most insightful judgments concern character, not thought.  He ‚was cun-
ning.  Preferring to be associated with the left, he was careful not to dissipate the nuanced 
ambiguity that separated his [Nietzschean] untimeliness from the leftism of his admirers.‛ 
(135)  Veyne captures the man with whom four of us had dinner in Santa Cruz just over a year 
before his death.  He was indeed an ‚elegant figure, steeped in sangfroid and clarity, [...] 
inflexible, cutting rather than ironical.‛ (143)  But blinded by his hatred of the Soviet Union, he 
supported France’s nuclear force-de-frappe.  The dinner argument intensified; later, one of us 
was in tears.  Too soon, all were. 
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